On September 24, 2008, Turkish officials announced the results of a much anticipated tender to build the country’s first nuclear power plant. The outcome, however, was a disappointment for Turkey’s pro-nuclear government: of the six companies expected to submit bids for the plant, only one – a consortium controlled by Russia’s Atomstroyexport – provided an actual proposal. With its nuclear energy plans facing stiff opposition from environmental groups at home, the current Turkish government is widely expected to cancel this disheartening tender, casting doubt on the future of Turkey’s nuclear energy program.

Whether Ankara overcomes this setback and pushes ahead with its nuclear energy ambitions depends largely on the dynamic security environment abroad and the ever-changing political situation at home. At this point, little evidence exists to suggest that Turkey’s nuclear energy goals are tied to future plans for weaponization. Nevertheless, it is clear that Turkey’s nuclear program, no matter how explicitly “peaceful,” is ultimately strategic in nature. Either by relieving Ankara of its dependence on foreign energy supplies or providing a hedge against potential long-term security threats, Turkey’s nuclear program has clearly been designed with its neighbors in mind.

The U.S.–Turkey Cooperation Agreement: An Early Success
Prior to the nuclear tender debacle, Turkey had scored a major success in relation to its nuclear energy ambitions. After eight years of delays, the U.S.–Turkey Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy finally entered into force on July 2. (For a detailed background of the agreement and its delays, see “ U.S. – Turkey Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Stirs Debate in Turkey, Sets Benchmarks for Anticipated U.S. – India Nuclear Accord” in the November 2006 issue of WMD Insights). [1] The agreement, which enables greater sharing of nuclear technology between the two countries, had been initially delayed due to concerns regarding Turkey’s past involvement in cases of nuclear smuggling. (See “Iran Exploited Turkish Trading Firm to Procure Dual-Use Goods From Western European, U.S. Companies,” in the July-August 2006 issue and “New Light Shed on Turkish, Sudanese Involvement in Nuclear Black Market Sales to Libya,” in the March 2006 issue of WMD Insights.) After a lengthy review, however, in January 2008 the U.S. administration officially backed the agreement, announcing “that the pertinent issues have been sufficiently resolved” and “that the proposed Agreement will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.” [2] Because the cooperation pact was based on an executive agreement rather than a formal treaty, it entered into force automatically after 60 days in the absence of a resolution of disapproval by the U.S. Congress.

The nuclear cooperation agreement outlines a number of specific prerequisites for Turkey to receive nuclear assistance:

• Technology transfer. The agreement permits the transfer of “[i]nformation concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” However, restricted data and technology deemed sensitive “shall not be transferred… unless provided for by an amendment” (Article 3).
• Nuclear material. The United States may provide only low-enriched uranium to Turkey (Article 4). In turn, Turkey may not reprocess or enrich any U.S.-supplied nuclear material involved in cooperative efforts without Washington’s approval (Article 6).
• Safeguards, accounting, and physical protection. Under the agreement, Turkey agrees to apply “IAEA safeguards with respect to all nuclear activities within [its] territory ” (Article 9). Furthermore, Turkey agrees to “establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of source and special nuclear material” and maintain “adequate physical protection” on all nuclear material and equipment related to the agreement (Article 7).
• Military purposes. Article 8 of the agreement explicitly forbids the use of transferred “[m]aterial, equipment and components … for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device, or for any military purpose.” [3]

Furthermore, U.S. officials have pressed Turkey to join the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), the Washington-led initiative to promote nuclear energy and reduce proliferation risks by establishing reprocessing centers for nuclear fuel. [4] Turkey has been invited to join the GNEP as a full member, but to date the country maintains observer status. [5] Rather than joining the U.S. initiative as a full member, Turkish nuclear energy officials have instead sought to develop cooperative nuclear efforts under the umbrella of the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission (TAEK), beginning with a proposed Turkish Atomic Energy Agency to coordinate peaceful nuclear cooperation among Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. [6] It remains to be seen whether Turkey’s refusal to seek full membership in the GNEP or TAEK’s plans to expand cooperation beyond the United States will adversely affect nuclear cooperation between the United States and Turkey.

The Failed Nuclear Tender
Turkish officials recently proposed the construction of three nuclear power plants to provide a total output of 8,000 to 10,000 MW in an ambitious effort to produce 8 percent of the country’s energy by nuclear power by 2020 and 20 percent by 2030. [7] On March 24, 2008, Turkey announced a tender to construct the first such nuclear power plant which will be developed near Akkuyu Bay on the Mediterranean coast, in the southern province of Mersin. [8] The planned nuclear power plant is intended to have a capacity of 4,000 megawatts, “plus or minus 25 percent.” The tender provided that the work would be awarded to the lowest bid for a 15-year contract guarantee to provide nuclear energy to the state. [9]

Yet problems with the tender began to emerge soon after the bid was first announced. At least four potential bidders, including Turkey’s Haci Ömer Sabancı Holding, expressed concern over the state of Turkey’s nuclear infrastructure, which some feared lacked the personnel to operate the planned facility. [10] Others were apprehensive of new Turkish laws that hold the operating company liable “for transporting radioactive materials and waste, as well as for any mishaps caused by negligence.” [11] Furthermore, the recent global economic crisis cast doubt on whether bidding companies could secure the immense financing required for such a venture. [12]

Given these concerns, at least four companies requested six-month extensions to examine further the specifics of the bid. The Turkish leadership, however, resisted such calls. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan explained that because the nuclear project was of vital importance, any extension would be an intolerable delay. [13] At the price of losing potential bidders, Turkey pressed ahead with the nuclear tender.

Ultimately, 13 firms and consortiums requested specifications for the tender, including entities from Canada, Japan, France, Russia, China, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Germany, as well as Turkey itself. [14] Of those 13, six provided sealed bids for the nuclear tender. Yet when those bids were opened on September 24, 2008, they revealed that only the consortium led by Atomstroyexport had submitted an actual proposal. [15] The other five thanked the Turkish government and expressed interest in the project but, citing a number of concerns, refused to provide an actual offer. [16]

With the successful bid, Atomstroyexport completed the first of three stages for the nuclear tender. The second stage of the proposal involves a review of technical documents by TAEK to determine whether the bid meets Turkish standards. [17] In the final stage, Turkish officials would reveal Atomstroyexport’s proposed price for the bid. After it was announced that Atomstroyexport provided the sole bid for the project, the tender received an overwhelmingly negative response from Turkish energy experts. Some experts have noted that the sole bid for the tender eliminates pricing flexibility, forcing Turkey to accept whatever offer price Atomstroyexport demands. [18] Other experts have expressed concern that the proposed project would make Turkey’s nuclear project heavily dependent on Russia because the plant would be fueled by a type of uranium that only Russia produces. [19]

If these experts’ claims are accurate, this would be an almost intolerable detail for Turkish officials to accept: one of the major reasons for Turkey’s interest in nuclear energy has been to reduce its dependence on Russia for energy supplies. Indeed, according to Turkish sources, TAEK has recommended the bid be cancelled because the Atomstroyexport proposal does not help Turkey achieve this goal. [20] Nevertheless, Atomstroyexport remains optimistic that it has “good prospects” for completing the proposal. [21] In early November 2008, TAEK officials announced that they neared a decision on the final status of the bid, but first required a technical clarification from Atomstroyexport, which the Russian entity [22] expects to provide to TAEK officials by mid-December. [23] The final decision on the Turkish nuclear tender is expected to be announced soon after TAEK officials review the new details provided by Atomstroyexport.
While the status of its first nuclear tender remains dubious, Turkey has already undertaken some steps to ensure that future nuclear tenders will be more successful. In early November 2008, Turkish officials announced that they will amend national legislation on nuclear power plants to make investment more attractive for foreign companies. [24] “There have to be some changes in the nuclear tender law for the second tender. Since the Turkish government is expected to offer the initial tender again if the Atomstroyexport bid is cancelled, these changes would be valid for a renewed Mersin tender as well,” a source within Turkey’s Energy Ministry said. [25]

Motivations and Variables behind Turkey’s Nuclear Ambitions
Turkish foreign policy and energy experts cite a host of factors that they believe have influenced or will influence – both positively and negatively – Turkey’s aspirations to develop civilian nuclear power. Among those variables commonly identified are Turkey’s domestic energy needs; opposition from environmental groups; Turkey’s relationship with Russia; and, likely most important, Turkey’s relationship with Iran.

Domestic Energy Needs
According to Turkish sources, Turkey’s rate of gas and electricity consumption is currently second only to China, and this consumption continues to grow at roughly 8 percent a year. [26] This rate of consumption threatens to surpass Turkey’s rate of production, creating energy shortages, although the recent financial crisis has somewhat slowed Turkish electricity consumption. [27] Nevertheless, substantial energy shortages in Turkey had been predicted to begin as early as 2009, and nuclear power has been proposed as a potential solution to this impending energy crisis, despite the long timeframe required to construct new nuclear power plants. [28]

Environmental Opposition
If recent history is any indication, the influence of opposition to Turkey’s nuclear plans from environmentalists should not be underestimated. Turkey’s anti-nuclear movement was born largely in reaction to the 1986 Chernobyl accident and the national leadership’s poor handling of incidents of radioactive contamination near the Black Sea (for example, high-level members of the Turkish leadership initially assured Turkish citizens that not only did radiation not pose a serious health risk, but that radiation may actually improve the taste of contaminated agricultural products). [29] The environmental opposition has since been a major barrier to TAEK’s quest to build Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, playing a significant role in the cancellation of similar nuclear tenders in the 1990s. [30]

Since plans for the most recent nuclear tenders were announced, environmentalists have organized a number of mass demonstrations against nuclear energy. These protests have brought together large coalitions of concerned environmentalists, minority political parties, and prominent Turkish artists and writers. [31] In response, Turkish officials have alternated between appeasing these movements on one hand and dismissing them on the other. In 2007, TAEK head Okay Çakıroğlu attempted to assuage environmental concerns by proclaiming that TAEK had “zero tolerance” for any mistakes that could potentially endanger Turkish citizens. [32] In 2008, however, members of the Turkish press lambasted Prime Minister Erdoğan for comments perceived as “dismissive” of Turkey’s anti-nuclear movement. [33] Regardless of how Turkish officials approach the environmental movement, it will likely remain a significant hurdle to Turkey’s nuclear ambitions.

Turkey – Russia Relations
As of July 2008, Russia supplied the vast majority of Turkey’s natural gas needs, nearly 38 billion cubic meters, or roughly 68 percent of Turkish consumption. [34] The vulnerability this dependence creates for Turkey was demonstrated during the August 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, during which Turkey permitted two U.S. naval vessels carrying aid to Georgia to enter the Black Sea. [35] In the weeks immediately following, Russia imposed restrictions on Turkish goods entering Russia, raising speculation that Russia was using its economic leverage over Turkey to punish the country for its behavior during the Russia-Georgia conflict. [36] Moreover, the dispute has been inevitably compared to the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis of January 2006, when Russia cut gas supplies to Ukraine in what some analysts perceived to be a vendetta against the election of a pro-Western government in Kiev. [37] Whatever Russia’s true intentions may have been, diversifying Turkey’s energy supplies and reducing its dependence on Russian supplies have been key considerations for Turkish energy officials. [38]

Turkey – Iran Relations
Perhaps the greatest influence on Turkey’s nuclear energy ambitions is its relationship with Iran. This, too, is an issue related to problems with energy supplies: Iran currently provides Turkey approximately 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year, second only to Russia. [39] Therefore, a degradation in relations with Iran could potentially bring with it a risk to Turkey’s energy imports, encouraging the development of alternative approaches such as nuclear energy. Such a scenario has only been reinforced in years past, as suspicions over Iran’s nuclear program threatened its relations with Turkey, a NATO member and regional competitor.

The warming of relations between Ankara and Tehran over the past year, however, makes it just as likely that the Turkish – Iranian relationship may actually serve to discourage Turkey’s nuclear energy program. In 2008, Turkish-Iranian relations made some significant strides forward, culminating with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s visit to Turkey in August. [40] Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan has even proposed that Turkey become a mediator in the U.S. – Iran nuclear dispute, citing stable relations with both parties. [41] Yet, the Turkish-Iranian relationship has improved beyond mere good feelings. On November 18, 2008, Iran signed an accord with Turkey to provide an increase of over 300 percent in the amount of natural gas Tehran supplies to Ankara. [42] Although this extended cooperation is still in its early stages and contingent on the construction of a new pipeline, this new accord could undercut much of the motivation for Turkey’s development of nuclear energy. With greater diversity in its energy supplies and improved relations with a potentially nuclear regional rival, it would be harder to justify the enormous investment required to kick-start a domestically sensitive nuclear program.

Conclusions
The past year has clearly been a volatile one for Turkey’s nuclear energy goals. The entry into force of the U.S.–Turkey Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy marks a milestone in Turkey’s efforts to obtain international support for its nuclear energy ambitions. The failure of the Mersin tender, however, will likely set the Turkish nuclear program back at least a year, if not longer, and perhaps considerably so. Meanwhile, a host of factors pressure Turkey in various directions. The continued stagnation in domestic energy consumption, for example, would relieve some pressure on the Turkish government to find quick energy solutions. A growth in the influence of environmental resistance could also provide a serious impediment to nuclear plans. On the other hand, the rise of a regionally assertive Russia could compel Turkey to find energy alternatives. In the end, the course of Turkey’s relationship with Iran may trump all other concerns. If Turkey’s relations with Iran quickly deteriorate, Turkey would likely seek to limit its dependence on Iranian gas and, depending on the status of Iran’s own nuclear program, pursue a nuclear hedge against future uncertainty. On the other hand, if Iran and Turkey continue to see eye-to-eye on a number of key issues, energy relations between the two countries could continue to flourish. In such a scenario, pro-nuclear forces in Turkey would be hard-pressed to promote successfully a controversial nuclear program that has little to show for its nearly four decades of work.

Adam P. Williams – Jamestown Foundation