Summer 2008. Still another proposal from world powers [1] arrived in Tehran. Brought by Javier Solana on June 14 after weeks of delay, [2] it was the object of severe criticism by the Iranian leadership even before it was examined. So, when Javier Solana and representatives from Moscow, Beijing, London and Paris were finally able to come to Iran, they had little hope of succeeding. Whatever the significance of the incentives
(energy, political, economic and social), the basic demand for suspension of enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities was still required. Even though the word “suspension” in the most recent proposal was weaker and less demanding than “cessation,” Tehran considered it unacceptable, even illegitimate. [3] Too bad, since four Security Council resolutions (1696 (2005), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008)) calling for a halt to Iranian actions had already been adopted by the Council’s five permanent members, who were also the authors of the June 2008 proposal. [4] Still, the Iranian team, after hours of discussion, said the text would be “studied.” While this inelegant piece of diplomacy was taking place, the Iranians publicly offered their own proposal calling for talks without preconditions, and generating some additional confusion. [5]

In this already roiling environment, two important events occurred. First, word was leaked about Israeli manoeuvres in the Aegean Sea in preparation for a possible air strike on Iran, giving the impression that the region was on the verge of war between Israel and Iran. Second, the United States raised the possibility of opening a diplomatic interests section in Iran, [6] with the Iranians indicating that they might agree (if asked directly by Washington). [7] This was followed by a decision to send a senior American official to participate in international talks with Iran on July 19, changing a long standing position that Washington would only meet with Iranian officials face-to-face after it complied with the Security Council resolutions and suspended uranium enrichment. [8]

At this point, confusion reached a peak: first, what was the purpose of the talks? [9] To reach an agreement on the EU3+3’s offer? On Iran’s paper? On some common ground between the two? On “the way forward,” a road map of the sort proposed to Tehran by the six powers to address a timetable for negotiations? When the Iranian official answer to the EU3+3 proposal finally arrived at the beginning of July, [10] it was clear that Tehran’s intention was to get some discussion on “common ideas” [11] and to put aside everything related to enrichment and reprocessing, let alone Iran’s studies directly related to military applications (see below). The reason for this ambiguous answer is clear: a definitive “no” would close the debate and lead to additional sanctions (or even worse), while an open door to “discussions,” particularly if they had no precise content, would provide some precious additional time [12]. It was a shrewd move.

The other parties agreed to talk about timetable and framework, rather than substance. The idea was to preserve a process and create a momentum, leaving the search for an outcome to better days. On this, Iran could hope to buy time and even to foment some division among the six nations involved in the offer and among the members of the European Union. Iran would also like the world to believe that it is actually ready for negotiations: “I believe we are now in a new environment with a new approaching perspective,” Foreign Minister Mottaki told CNN on July 6. Meanwhile, the same Mottaki wrote to Javier Solana that “the time for negotiating from the condescending position of inequality has come to an end,” forgetting that for Iran, the object of four United Nations Security Council resolutions, [13] an international incentive package was already a significant concession.

But here we are, talking about talks for some weeks. The Iranian negotiator, Saed Jalili, having refused on July 19 to say whether he could accept the simple proposal made by Javier Solana in the name of the six powers. [14] It is difficult to imagine the agenda of further meetings. In short, the current state of play of the diplomatic track is anything but clear.

Second, was the United States, after so many years, trying to install a diplomatic presence in Iran without full recognition? If so, what would be the objective of this initiative at the end of the Bush administration? To put aside the abrasive rhetoric? To try to convince the American people that everything possible has been attempted? To improve Iranian “cooperation” in Iraq? To open a channel for economic exchanges? [15] A mix of all the above goals? It is difficult to tell. In any case, the initiative, if confirmed, would hardly be a sign of weakness; the United States already has a similar arrangement with Cuba. But would Tehran actually say “yes,” if asked directly? The answer is far from clear. Tehran may find it politically more useful - domestically and in the region - to humiliate Washington by answering “no” after being asked formally. There are precedents. [16] While Iran’s interest is clear, the Iranian leadership may want to prolong the confrontation with the United States, particularly in an electoral period (Ahmadinejad’s first term is coming to an end in 2009).

But, if Washington were seriously to consider not only sending representatives to Iran, opening diplomatic bilateral talks with Tehran after the presidential elections and the arrival of a new administration in January 2009, it would be a different matter. Before opening such talks, let alone some sort of negotiation, it is worth noting that no serious negotiations have taken place between Washington and Tehran for thirty years. Moreover, although the European experience since 2003 may be limited, it provides interesting information and insights into the way Tehran uses formal talks. [17] Back channel or track two discussions – some of
which took place during this long period of formal non-engagement between the United States and Iran - cannot be considered in any way a substitute for the real thing. [18] As a consequence, before the new administration takes office in January 2009, prior consultation with the Europeans would be useful. Indeed, William Burns has already come back from Geneva with valuable insights into the Iranian negotiator, Saed Jalili, his endless lectures, and Iran’s apparent unwillingness to reach a settlement not only on the nuclear issue, but also on the relationship with the United States. This is probably the most useful result of his presence in the July meeting: he saw a man who was not in the mood to discuss, let alone negotiate. Some Americans may still believe that no result has been achieved because Washington was not “seriously” involved, or not involved “enough.” This may be wrong. [19]

Third, was Israel readying for an attack on Iranian soil? If yes, could it be done without U.S. consent and even help? Indeed, in the case of the Israeli raid against the reactor in northeastern Syria on September 6, 2007, Washington insisted that no green light had ever been given to Tel Aviv: “None was asked for, none was given.” [20] But when information was released in April concerning the nuclear reactor built with the help of North Korea, President Bush said that releasing this information was a way of “sending a message to Iran and the world for that matter about just how destabilizing nuclear proliferation would be in the Middle East,” thus more or less condoning a posteriori the Israeli strike. But Iran is not in the same category as Syria [21]. A military operation against Iran would have to be much more extensive, much longer, and thus
considerably more difficult. The Pentagon is all too aware of the inherent challenges. Admiral Mullen,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told an Israeli journalist that a conflict with Iran would be “a very
significant challenge.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, widely admired for his wisdom, added a note on a different point in mid-May, referring to U.S. military resources: “There is no doubt that… we would be hard pressed to fight another major conventional war right now.”

From Tehran’s perspective, threats are clear: on July 8, 2008 an aide [22] to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared that Iran’s first response to any attack over its nuclear program would be a strike on Israel, on the U.S. navy in the Gulf, and against U.S. interests throughout the world (a clear reference to terrorism). [23] The statement came as the Revolutionary Guards embarked on a new round of war games (Great Prophet III) aimed at “improving the combat capability” of their forces. During the war drill, the Guards were reported to have test-fired nine missiles, including one which Tehran claims has the range to reach Israel (a new
version of the Shahab-3 and a clear message to Tel Aviv). Washington responded to the missile tests by
saying that Iran’s development of ballistic missiles was a violation of United Nations Security Council
resolutions.

At a time when tension is increasing over Tehran’s nuclear program, the United States should take into
account the existential threat that an Iranian bomb would pose to Israel. This may be why President Bush has reportedly issued an “amber light” to a possible Israeli strike. [24] The two presidential candidates, Barak Obama and John McCain, agree at least on one point: Iran cannot be permitted to build nuclear weapons. Finally, Israel does not want to let Tehran acquire the amount of highly enriched uranium needed for a nuclear weapon. Therefore it “has a real sense of urgency.” [25] New Russian-made air-defenses arriving in Iran in the coming months to protect its nuclear and ballistic missile sites are also likely to be seen in Tel Aviv as complicating an already difficult military option. How can one make sense of all the above?

Confusion seems to reign everywhere: in the EU3+3 negotiations, on the U.S.-Iran diplomatic front, and with respect to the military option. But in one respect, things have never been clearer: the objectives of Iran’s nuclear efforts are not civilian. Iran may still be insisting that its nuclear program, including its controversial acquisition of uranium enrichment centrifuges, its Green Salt project, [26] its high explosives testing, [27] and its work on a missile re-entry vehicle, is aimed only at generating electricity. [28] It may still be insisting that the involvement of the military in all stages of the program, from mining to ballistic missiles, is irrelevant. But after the June report to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, [29] who can believe any of this? [30] The IAEA, in an unusually blunt evaluation, said that Iran’s activities remained “a matter of serious concern,” and that it continued to owe the agency “substantial explanations.” The quest for a nuclear weapon is the only credible explanation for the secrecy that has surrounded Iran’s program, the involvement of its military, the multiple purchases and attempted purchases traced around the world – notably in the black market – the projects that can have no other possible goal than a military one, [31] and Iran’s many lies, ploys and stalling tactics. Iran’s constant refusal to halt uranium enrichment work [32] at a time when its only nuclear reactor (Bushehr) has got Russian fuel for its operation throughout its life makes absolutely no sense, unless Tehran feels a need to acquire fissile material for a bomb as soon as possible.

The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 2007 that Iran’s work on a warhead was interrupted in the fall of 2003. [33] But do we know what stage had been reached by that time as far as “weaponization” was concerned? Did Tehran already know how to produce a warhead small enough to fit in its modified
Shahab-3 ballistic missile? According to David Albright, “the design of smaller, more sophisticated nuclear weapons than the design found in Libya” [34] was found in the computer files of the Swiss nationals Friedrich, Marco, and Urs Tinner. Does Iran have the designs found in the computers? If so, where did the designs come from? [35] No information was available in the public version of the NIE on these essential questions. Nor was any indication ever given about whether the classified version had any answers to them either. But if the answer is yes and Iran bought the designs, then the only remaining obstacle to Iran getting a nuclear weapon would be the fissile material (i.e., enough highly enriched uranium to produce the warhead). This reality underlines how important it is to achieve what the United Nations Security Council has constantly asked Tehran to do: to cease, or at least suspend, any activity related to production of fissile material. At a summit in Japan on July 8, leaders of the Group of Eight (G-8) called on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment “without further delay” precisely for this reason. Those who still insist on a “right” to enrich under the NPT do not take into account first, that this right exists only as long as the country concerned does not have a military purpose, and second, that Iran may now need only fissile material to obtain a nuclear weapon.

According to Mohammed el Baradei, IAEA’s Director General, “considering the number of centrifuges and the quantity of uranium Iran has,” it would need six months, starting in June, to get the necessary quantity for a first weapon. [36] That is to say that, by November 2008, the time of the U.S. election, Iran could have solved its main difficulty in acquiring a nuclear weapon, assuming Iran knows how to get highly enriched
uranium without being detected. On this point, it is worth noting that, technically, it is far easier to get highly enriched uranium (HEU) from low enriched uranium (LEU), than to produce LEU from uranium hexafluoride (UF6). Production of HEU needs only a rearrangement of centrifuges in the facility; this may be done quickly enough to deceive international inspectors. The last point is important for Iran if the objective is to prevent detection that would trigger additional sanctions at the Security Council. Assuming that Iran has no clandestine facility and wants to use Natanz to conceal part of its enrichment process from international oversight, it is still doable. But if there is another – clandestine – facility, where the scientists who disappeared from Natanz currently work, it is even easier. This does not automatically mean that Iran has overcome all technical obstacles, but it does indicate that progress has been made [37] and that further progress could still be made in the months to come.

Since 2003, Tehran has tried to reach a point at which the entire world will be confronted with the fait accompli of an ineluctable process that will result in a nuclear bomb. It is about to reach its goal. The world would now be wise to realize what could be expected from Iran with the bomb, taking into account what Tehran already does without it. [38] If there should be neither bomb nor war, effective international inspections [39] and effective sanctions are urgently needed. These measures cannot be delayed until the U.S. presidential election, which in reality would make the world impotent until the fall of 2009 (taking into account the congressional confirmation process). [40] By then, the choice between bomb and war may no longer exist. Someone else would already have made it. Indeed, what is it that the Iranian leader will try to get by the fall 2009? It is not hard to guess.

Thérèse Delpech - Atomic Energy Commission, Paris