On February 1, 2008, a report from Deutsche Welle detailed the latest developments in an ongoing struggle on the part of the residents of the Baltic coast city of Lübeck, Germany to convince local authorities to address the problem of chemical weapons (CW) dumped approximately five miles offshore in 1961. [1] This story is just one instance of a growing public interest in sea-dumped chemical weapons that spans the globe. Since 2003, for example, some half dozen states bordering the Baltic Sea have raised concerns that plans for the construction of a natural-gas pipeline on the Baltic seabed could release CW dumped into the Baltic after World War II. [2] Also in 2003, the Australian government revealed that over twenty-one thousand tons of CW munitions had been dumped off its coasts in the late 1940s. [3] In the United States, sea-dumped CW munitions gained fresh notice following a series of reports published in the Virginian Daily Press in late 2005. [4] In Hawaii this report attracted the interest of local officials and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and led to calls for investigations to determine the extent of the problem off the coast of Oahu. [5]

The issue is global in nature and has the potential to affect many littoral nations. Chemical weapons and other surplus munitions were dumped in many of the world’s large bodies of water, including the Baltic Sea, the North Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, the Indian Ocean, the North Sea, the North and South Pacific Oceans, the Tasman Sea, and the White Sea. The bulk of dumped chemical weapons were deposited in the aftermath of the two World Wars when vast quantities of munitions were seized from defeated enemies or rendered surplus by the end of the conflict. Rather than attempt to maintain huge stockpiles of chemical weapons of uncertain utility for an indefinite period, the decision was made to eliminate the weapons in the most efficient way possible. Although some weapons were eliminated by detonation, open-pit burning, or simple release into the atmosphere, the majority were loaded into ships that were then scuttled or offloaded in designated areas.

It is important to note that, in addition to the dumping of tens of thousands of tons of chemical munitions into the world’s seas, many more tens of thousands of tons of conventional explosives were also disposed of in this manner, sometimes in the same shipments or locations. Although there are disagreements over some of the details of chemical breakdown under various seabed conditions, it is clear that the munitions are subject to corrosion effects rendering them fragile or even resulting in leakage of CW agents. [6] There is also good evidence that certain types of explosive can become extremely unstable with the passage of time. [7] This story examines recent controversies about the dumped CW in the Baltic Sea and off the coast of the Hawaiian Island of Oahu.

The Baltic Sea Case
European concerns over the potential impact of CW sea-dumping first emerged in the 1950s, especially in those countries surrounding the Baltic. The Baltic Sea was a major dumping ground for hundreds of thousands of metric tons of captured and surplus weapons in the immediate aftermath of World War II, including up to 40,000 tons of CW munitions and containers. [8] The dumping process involved two different methods. One approach was to sail a ship out into the Baltic and dump boxes and crates of munitions overboard. The other approach was to fill the holds of surplus cargo ships with large quantities of munitions, sail the ship to a designated area and then scuttle the vessel. [9] In addition to generalized concern resulting from the knowledge that tens of thousands of tons of CW agents lie corroding on the seabed within a few miles of the coast, Baltic nations have had more concrete reminders of the potential for these war relics to cause continuing harm.

Baltic fishing vessels encounter CW munitions and residues of varying quantities in their nets with some regularity, occasionally resulting in injuries to crewmembers. [10] There have also been incidents where chemical munitions have washed ashore. The frequency of both types of event has substantially declined since the 1970s, however. [11]

With the exception of a singular operation in 1959-60 to raise, repackage, and subsequently re-dump two shiploads of artillery shells filled with the nerve agent Tabun, the main results of European concerns have been ongoing scientific studies intended to examine and better understand the process by which CW agents break down under seabed conditions and to determine the environmental impact, if any, from this process. [12] From time to time, there have been discussions regarding what should be done about the large undersea dumpsites with proposals ranging from doing nothing, to encasing the munitions in concrete, or even to raising and safely disposing of them as is done with land-based old chemical weapons (OCW). [13] The scientific consensus has been that the munitions are best left where they are to break down through the action of seawater. [14] This position is supported by evidence that the rate at which agents are being released into the surrounding environment is generally quite low and unlikely to pose a risk to shore-based communities. [15] It is further bolstered by research showing that, with the exception of blister agents, especially thickened Mustard agent, the majority of CW agent types have very short lifetimes when exposed to seawater. [16] However, underlying these conclusions is the assumption that the munitions will lie essentially undisturbed. A factor behind the recent increase in concern in the Baltic communities is the possibility that this assumption is no longer valid.

The Nord Stream Pipeline
The key change potentially invalidating all previous assumptions about the stability of the Baltic undersea CW dumpsites is a plan for the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline. In September 2005, the German and Russian governments agreed to the $5.5 billion dollar project, which will carry natural gas directly from Russian gas fields to German consumers, supplementing existing overland routes. [17] A major portion of the pipeline will run along the Baltic seabed and the governments of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden have all expressed objections to the project. [18] (See map, below.) Indeed, before the project was even agreed upon, officials and groups within these countries claimed that construction might disturb the CW dumpsites and result in the release of significant quantities of nerve or blister agents into the environment, threatening coastal populations and local fisheries. [19] Nongovernmental environmental and public interest groups have also expressed objections ranging from total rejection of the project to calls for more thorough environmental impact studies. [20] Recently a Lithuanian Member of Parliament claimed that the “coordinates of about 80 percent of CW in the Baltic Sea are still classified by the United States and Great Britain, [and] therefore it is impossible to determine the location and condition of the weapons.” [21] The basis for this claim, which has not received public support from any other country, is unclear. Furthermore, this claim contradicts the conclusions of the official studies and surveys of the 1990s, such as that conducted by the Helsinki Commission, which concluded that the dump areas had all been adequately identified. [22]

Spokespersons for Nord Stream AG, the company responsible for constructing the pipeline, have acknowledged that there is justified concern over the project’s effects on the CW dumpsites and that the company is therefore undertaking additional research to determine these effects. [23] The company has attempted to assure opponents more than once that “the pipeline has been placed in such a way that it doesn’t come near the munition [sic] chemical dump sites” and that the construction process will not disturb CW munitions on the seabed. [24] Furthermore, Nord Stream has undertaken a series of detailed surveys of the proposed routes to ensure that explosive and CW hazards are avoided. The company has claimed the results of seabed surveys show that there are no CW hazards along the proposed route. [25] Nevertheless, Nord Stream’s maps clearly show the proposed pipeline route passing through CW dumping risk zones south of Gotland Island, providing some support for the arguments of those who oppose the project. [26]

In a 1994 report, the Helsinki Commission added another dimension to these concerns. The Commission’s Report on Chemical Munitions Dumped in the Baltic Sea stated that the seabed in the dump areas is covered in anywhere from five to eight meters of soft mud into which the munitions gradually settle. [27] The report also noted that in the past 40 years, fishing activities have spread an unknown portion of those items loosely dumped on the seabed from their original sites. [28] Thus, it is possible that some of the dumped CW munitions are by now buried below the seabed and potentially hidden from Nord Stream’s surveys in new locations, while remaining at potential risk from pipeline laying activity. Nord Stream clearly believes that it has taken this issue into account during its research into the issue, but as yet it has not been able to satisfy opponents that its methods and results are adequate.

There is at least one previous case that supports the concerns of opponents to the project. In 1995, at least 4,500 World War II incendiary bombs washed up on Scottish beaches. Available evidence strongly indicated that the sudden and rather unexpected appearance of these items on the Scottish coast was a consequence of trench-digging as part of the construction of an undersea pipeline between Scotland and Ireland that had begun a few days earlier. [29] Although the Nord Stream project will not be using a buried pipe for much of its route, the company acknowledges that even in these parts of the route there will still be some digging and filling on the seabed to smooth seabed irregularities or to avoid shipping lanes. [30] Environmental groups, however, claim that the project “will involve digging up some sixty million cubic meters of material along the German coast” and “plowing [a trench] up to four meters deep and thirty meters wide” on the seabed, potentially leading to disturbance of undetected munitions. [31]

Environmental or Strategic Concerns?
Although concerns about disruption of CW dumpsites have featured prominently in objections to the proposed pipeline, it is likely that for some of the more vocal countries these are not the primary drivers for their opposition to the project. The Polish government has frequently objected to the pipeline, noting the CW issue, potential environmental damage, the exclusion of Poland from the project’s benefits, and the high cost relative to a land-based route through Polish territory. [32] On October 19, 2006, the speaker of the Polish Senate, Bogdan Borusewicz, made clear that Poland’s primary objections to the pipeline were strategic rather than economic or environmental. In an unambiguous reference to Russia’s interruption of gas supplies to Ukraine in January 2006, Mr. Borusewicz said: “Russia can’t stop supplying gas to Poland now, since many Western European countries would suffer from this, but when the North Gas Pipeline is built, then it could stop such supplies. … From the point of view of strategic interests, this isn’t good for our situation.” [33] At the same time, Mr. Borusewicz made it clear that a Russian proposal to extend a branch line to Poland was unacceptable as “each connection has a valve that can be turned off.” [34]

As noted above, the Lithuanian government has also been a vocal critic of the proposed route, highlighting the potential environmental dangers. Prior to the decision to run the pipeline along the seabed, Poland and the Baltic States were promoting an alternative overland route passing through their territory; an option that they have continued to promote despite the seabed decision. [35] If this alternative route had been accepted, both countries would have received transit fees, the ability to draw from the pipeline, and the potential capability to reverse the direction of flow and draw on North Sea gas sources in the event that Russia interrupted the supply for any reason. [36]

Not all supporters of the pipeline project are convinced that claims of environmental risks are entirely disinterested. In Moscow the president of the Chemical Security Union, for example, stated that, “Underwater gas pipelines built at a high technological level … do not cause environmental problems. As far as the future Baltic gas pipeline is concerned there is more politics there than ecology.” [37]

Although all of the countries objecting to the Nord Stream pipeline express concerns that CW dumpsites might be disturbed, there appears to be a division in motivation between those for whom the environmental concern is paramount and those who are attempting to use this issue to support their broader goal of impeding the project’s progress. Sweden appears to be the only country that has no interest beyond that associated with protection of its local marine environment. As promoters of a land-route that would pass through their territory, the motives of Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland in raising environmental concerns have been challenged on a number of occasions by supporters of the project. Ultimately, judgments about the potential impact of the pipeline project on dumped CW and the Baltic Sea rest on assumptions about the ability of the company to avoid dumpsites, known or unknown. Nord Stream appears to be very confident that its planning and surveying efforts will eliminate most dangers along the route. In contrast, those objecting to the project do not believe that all CW dumpsites can be identified in advance, presenting the possibility that uncharted sites could be disturbed by construction, releasing CW agents into the environment.

Without an authoritative description of the location of the various CW dumping sites, it is difficult to judge the reasonableness of the environmental and safety concerns raised by the littoral states. On the one hand, the mixed motivations of some of these states add to uncertainties over how seriously this issue should be taken. On the other hand, the magnitude of past dumping and the inevitable disruption to the seabed caused by the Nord Stream project suggest that the danger of possible CW leakage is one that, at the least, deserves continuing governmental attention and public discussion.

Sea-Dumped CW Off Oahu
Chemical weapons were dumped in the ocean off the coast of the Hawaiian island of Oahu in 1944 and 1945, where they appear to have lain essentially forgotten until the Virginian Daily Press drew attention to the dumpsites in 2005. [38] The media reports that CW munitions were on the seabed and especially that at least 600 tons of mustard gas were only five miles offshore from Pearl Harbor appear to have come as something of a shock to the American public. The issue was swiftly picked up by local politicians, who demanded that the U.S. Army provide more details as to the agents dumped, their locations, current condition, and the potential environmental hazard posed by the agents. [39] Newspaper reports claiming that “the effects of ocean disposal have never been studied” highlighted the media’s ignorance of international developments and research on sea-dumped CW. At the same time, the U.S. Army’s claims that the munitions off Pearl Harbor were inaccessible due to their depth of 1,000 to 1,500 feet do not reflect the results of European studies of this issue, which note changes in fisheries practices since 1945, most importantly the introduction of deep-sea trawling. [40] In contrast to the situation in the Baltic, however, there are no proposals for underwater infrastructure developments on the Hawaiian seabed that might disturb the munitions. Unlike the Baltic dumpsites, none of the Hawaiian sites included nerve agents; instead they contain cyanogen chloride, hydrogen cyanide, and a variety of blister agents. [41] International studies suggest that most of the munitions will harmlessly corrode on the seabed and that released agents will be diluted sufficiently to avoid hazard, with the mustard gas being the most long-lived item. [42]

Hawaiian politicians have used the CW issue as a basis to obtain congressional earmarks for local research facilities. In November 2007, Representative Neil Abercrombie and Senator Daniel K. Akaka succeeded in adding language to the 2008 Defense Appropriations Bill that would provide $5.5 million for studies of dumped munitions off the Hawaiian coast. [43] This funding builds on $2 million earmarked for the University of Hawaii in the 2007 Defense Appropriations Bill to survey the munitions as part of a process of determining whether to salvage them or leave them in place. [44]

Conclusion
Public concern over the potential environmental impacts inherent in sea-dumped CW is genuine. The nature of the actual dangers represented by these items, however, is less certain. The current furor over sea-dumped CW munitions in the Baltic Sea region highlights the way in which genuine public concerns can, in some cases, be exploited in the service of broader national goals. Although this process may produce certain benefits, such as additional funding for research into the hazards associated with the gradual decay of the munitions and the agents that they contain, it can also have negative impacts. The most important of these is to alarm the public without effectively informing them. Too often, the results of past scientific investigations into the behavior of sea-dumped CW munitions appear to have been ignored in order to provide support for unrelated strategic or economic considerations. Although additional research may be useful, to date it has not generated results that undermine existing conclusions that, unless subject to specific new stresses, the munitions are best left where they are.

Markus K. Binder – Independent Consultant