Over the course of the past several months, missile developments in Taiwan have become a topic of growing interest in both the Chinese and Taiwanese media. Discussion has centered primarily on two systems, the Hsiung Feng (Brave Wind) -2E (HF-2E) cruise missile and the Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile (ATBM). These systems appear to give Taiwan expanded options for deterring attacks from mainland China, although questions remain about the capabilities of both systems.

The HF-2E is reported by the Chinese and Taiwanese press to be a land-attack cruise missile (LACM) with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers, although the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense insists that it is an anti-ship system, which would limit its land-attack capabilities to coastal targets. [1] While it shares a name with the HF-2 anti-ship cruise missile, which is already in service, Mainland reports claim that it has little relationship to the anti-ship system in terms of its capabilities and likely mission. [2]

The HF-2E is 6.25 meters long, 50 centimeters in diameter, weighs approximately 1,600 kilograms, and flies at roughly 800 kilometers per hour. [3] It is reported to carry a 400-450 kilogram payload. [4] The missile was reported to have been fired 500 kilometers into the Pacific Ocean, where it hit its intended target. [5] However, the test, in itself, does not indicate whether the system has the ability to attack land-based targets beyond those at the water’s edge.

Notwithstanding official Taiwanese declarations that the system has no land-attack capabilities, Chinese reports claim that the HF-2E system is capable of striking political and military targets throughout southeast China and that it therefore poses a serious threat to the stability of relations across the Taiwan Strait. [7] Moreover, according to Chinese sources, Taiwan hopes to extend the range of the HF-2E missile to 2,000 kilometers. [8] This would enable the system to strike Beijing and the Three Gorges Dam. [9] However, reports in the Chinese press also note that the HF-2E’s existing engine limits its range and that until Taiwan obtains better engine technology, the HF-2E will not actually be able to hit the Chinese capital. [10]

In addition, Chinese press reports have stated that Taiwan lacks both mapping data for more distant Chinese targets and a guidance system that is capable of hitting such targets while avoiding topographical obstacles en route. [12] The reports suggest that even Chinese analysts are uncertain whether the HF-2E could preemptively attack Chinese missile installations that are inland from the Chinese coast.

Although the United States possesses the technology that Taiwan needs in these areas, Chinese reports indicate that Washington has thus far refused to provide it to Taiwan. [13] U.S. transfers of such technology would be inconsistent with U.S. participation in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which restricts assistance for missile programs seeking to develop systems that can carry a 500 kilogram payload to a distance of 300 kilometers or more, or equivalent systems (in which range has been reduced to increase payload or vice versa). Both the existing HF-2E and a possible extended range version of the missile would exceed this threshold. Indeed, reports in the Taiwanese press suggest that the United States is working to discourage Taiwan from developing long-range land-attack cruise missiles. [14]

In early September 2006, the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense (MND) declared that, “Our military build-up plan is based on the strategic notion of deterrence, and self-defense, with safeguarding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as our ultimate goal.” [15] The MND went on to state that reports that the HF-2E is capable of targeting Beijing and other political and military targets are “misleading and totally wrong.” [16] As noted, the MND insists that the HF-2E is not an LACM, but rather a medium-range anti-ship cruise missile. [17]

A second system that is receiving extensive coverage in the Chinese and Taiwanese press is Taiwan’s ATBM system. This system has yet to receive an official name, but has been code-named the “Layered System Plan,” (tseng-his chi-hua). [18] It has also been dubbed by Chinese and Taiwanese sources as Taiwan’s “Patriot” system, referring to the well-known U.S. anti-tactical missile system. [19] Reporting from China and Taiwan indicates that from 2001-2007 the island’s government allocated more than NT $ 18.365 billion (U.S. $ 553.2 million) for the research and development of the system. [20] This missile will be Taiwan’s first domestically developed and produced ATBM and is intended to intercept and destroy China’s
M series ballistic missiles, specifically the 600-kilometer range M-9 and 300-kilometer range M-11 systems that have been deployed in substantial numbers over the past several years across the Taiwan Strait. [21] Chinese reporting also indicates that the ATBM will be able to defend against cruise missile attacks. [22] The ATBM is armed with a traditional warhead using a pre-fragmentation design, intended to explode near the incoming missile to destroy either the missile as a whole or, at least, its ability to successfully hit the intended target. [23] Chinese reporting indicates that future Taiwanese missile defenses will rely on the U.S. Patriot systems for one third of the defense mission and on the new ATBM for two thirds of that mission. [24]

There is little discussion currently in the Chinese media about sales to Taiwan of the U.S. Patriot Advanced Concept-3 (PAC-3), the most advanced U.S. anti-tactical ballistic missile system. Washington originally offered this system to Taiwan several years ago, but partisan politics in Taipei has prevented passage of the required legislation to fund the purchase. However, according to Taiwanese media reports, it appears that Taiwan will likely pass legislation in the coming year for the purchase of the PAC-3 system. [25] In total, the island’s budget calls for the purchase of 6 PAC-3 batteries. [26] (Taiwan has previously acquired the less capable PAC-2 system.)

Taiwan’s continued push to develop the indigenous HF-2E and the ATBM implies a commitment to acquiring some counter to the missile threat from China, however problematic such efforts might prove against China’s growing missile holdings. Depending on its overland capabilities, the HF-2E could allow Taiwan to disrupt PRC missile launches preemptively, assuming that such strikes occurred before China deploys its mobile missile batteries to uncertain hidden locations. It is highly doubtful that Taiwan, on its own, could identify and attack Chinese mobile missile launchers, once they had departed their peacetime facilities. That Taiwanese military analysts have discussed the possibility of instituting a “preventive self-defense” strike option, involving early use of cruise missiles to create confusion in China’s strike plans, may explain Washington’s reported consternation about Taiwan's HF-2E program. [27] The ATBM, on the other hand, could protect key Taiwanese military sites, such as airfields, against those missiles that the Chinese succeeded in launching. [28] As Chinese military modernization continues, including Beijing’s deployment of growing numbers of M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles and Dong Hai-10 and Ying Ji-63 LACMs across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan’s motivation to pursue its own countervailing missile capabilities is likely to remain strong. In the meantime, all that appears certain is that missile developments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait could be headed in an increasingly unstable direction.

Erik Quam, Jing-Dong Yuan - Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies